We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit … renegotiate the resulting contract without cost by proposing a new mechanism any number of times. We provide a general …-to-use tool to analyze contracting problems with limited commitment. We apply the solution concept to a setting with a continuous …

used as commitment devices when it is impossible to commit not to renegotiate them. We characterize renegotiation …

We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit … renegotiate the resulting contract without cost by proposing a new mechanism any number of times. We provide a general …-to-use tool to analyze contracting problems with limited commitment. We apply the solution concept to a setting with a continuous …

It is well known that delegating the play of a game to an agent via incentive contracts may serve as a commitment …

contract renegotiation is a powerful tool for incentive provision, despite the stationarity of the environment. Continuation …

-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant … threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to strategically equivalent bargaining situations … in which no ex ante contract was written. The ex ante contract causes sellers to ask for markups that are 45 percent …

standard one period contract, where all information arrives at once. Although increasing the number of contingencies will … always decrease the agency cost, it can have the adverse effect of weakening the principal's commitment not to renegotiate …