We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …

We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …

approaches to coalition formation, one based on cooperative game theory, the other based on noncooperative bargaining. Three …

Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard Baron-Ferejohn model of bargaining … over the division of a pie, in which bargaining ends as soon as the committee reaches an agreement. In standing committees …

We study a legislative bargaining game in which failure to agree in a given round may result in a breakdown of …

One feature of legislative bargaining in naturally occurring settings is that the distribution of seats or voting … weights often does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Game-theoretic predictions about payoffs and coalition formation …

bargaining theory are also studied …

A new feature pertaining to proposer's ability to implement offers is introduced in the extensive form bargaining … Bargaining Solution. For strictly supermodular games, Core is a binding constraint on Nash Bargaining Solution while for the …

Some authors present models in which they show that the Nash bargaining solution fails to be Maskin monotonic and hence … bargaining solution can be discussed in utility space. Arguing that the status quo should be treated as initial endowments, we … keep it fixed and show that with this assumption the Nash bargaining solution satisfies Maskin monotonicity. The key …