We provide three alternative characterizations of the proportional solution defined on compact and comprehensive bargaining problems with claims that are not necessarily convex. One characterization result is obtained by using, together with other standard axioms, two solidarity axioms. Another...

We consider the problem where agents bargain over their shares of a perfectly divisible commodity. The aim of this paper is to identify the class of bargaining solutions induced by dominant strategy implementable allocation rules. To this end, we characterize the class of dominant strategy...

Nash (1950) proposes a bargaining theory. This paper proves that Nash’s theory is not about bargaining, but is the result of exchange. Exchange also requires bargaining, but exchange itself is not bargaining

In order to be able to devise successful strategies for destabilizing terrorist organizations it is vital to recognize and understand their structural properties. This paper deals with the optimal communication structure of terrorist organizations when considering the tradeoff between secrecy...

We provide natural mechanisms for the Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution if the set of possible payoff allocations is unknown to the planner. The need for two different mechanisms arises, because the case of three or more agents and that of two require separate treatment....

In this paper we investigate trade union formation. To this end we apply a model with two types of labour where both groups decide on whether they prefer to be represented by either two independent craft-specific (professional) labour unions or by a joint (encompassing) labour union. Applying...

We consider a class of perfect information unanimity bargaining games, where the players have to choose a payoff vector from a fixed set of feasible payoffs. The proposer and the order of the responding players is determined by a state that evolves stochastically over time. The probability...

Consider a model of bargaining, in which two players, 1 and 2, share a pie of size y. The bargaining environment is described by a set a parameters λ that may affect agents' preferences over the agreement sharing, the status quo outcome, or both. The outcomes (i.e., whether an agreement is...