This chapter focuses on a series of experiments investigating decision behavior in single-stage, two-person bargaining over the exchange of a single commodity, where neither trader knows with precision the reservation value that the other places on the good or service being bought or sold....

We extend the sealed-bid k-double-auction mechanism from a single- to two-round game where offers are made simultaneously during each round. If an agreement is reached on round 1, then the traders realize their profit and the game is over. If not, equipped with information about the round 1 bids...

The sealed-bid k-double auction mechanism for two-person bargaining under incomplete information can be extended by providing a bonus for both traders if, and only if, an agreement is reached. Brams and Kilgour (1996) proved that there is a unique level of bonus, namely, half the difference...

Experimental Business Research includes papers that were presented at the First Asian Conference on Experimental Business Research held at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST), on December 7-10, 1999. The conference was organized by the Center for Experimental Business...