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Transparency and fairness in school choice mechanisms

Hermstrüwer, Yoan - 2019

assumptions in matching theory, I show that the Boston mechanism improves perceived fairness. These results underscore the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012041733

Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects

Ekici, Özgün - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 19 (2024) 2, pp. 551-564

We revisit the classical object reallocation problem under strict preferences. When attention is constrained to the set of Pareto-efficient rules, it is known that top trading cycles (TTC) is the only rule that is strategy-proof and individually rational. We relax this constraint and consider...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014576683

Pairing games and markets

Alkan, Ahmet; Tuncay, Alparslan - 2014

Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010350435

On the Survival of Some Unstable Two-Sided Matching Mechanisms : An Experimental and Computational Investigation of the Stability Hypothesis

Ünver, M. Utku - 2001

dates in two-sided matching markets inspired by the entry-level professional labor markets for medical interns in Britain … acceptance mechanism in preventing early contracts in the experiment although it performs better than the priority matching …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014124279

Eliciting information from a committee

Zapechelnyuk, Andriy - 2012

The paper addresses the mechanism design problem of eliciting truthful information from a committee of informed experts who collude in their information disclosure strategies. It is shown that under fairly general conditions full information disclosure is possible if and only if the induced...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009517819

Bilateral trade with loss-averse agents

Benkert, Jean-Michel - 2022 - This version: July 2022

The endowment and attachment effect are empirically well-documented in bilateral trade situations. Yet, the theoretical literature has so far failed to formally identify these effects. We ftll this gap by introducing expectations-based loss aversion, which can explain both effects, into the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013362215

Price Setting in a Decentralized Market and the Competitive Outcome

Lauermann, Stephan - 2018

This paper studies a decentralized, dynamic matching and bargaining market: buyers and sellers are matched into pairs …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014219803

Transparent matching mechanisms

Möller, Markus - 2024

I study a central authority's ability to commit to a publicly announced mechanism in a one-to-one agent-object matching … model. The authority announces a strategy-proof mechanism and then privately selects a mechanism to initiate a matching. An … agent's observation in form of the final matching has an innocent explanation (Akbarpour and Li, 2020), if given the agent …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014533360

Externality assessments, welfare judgments, and mechanism design

Daske, Thomas - 2017

How agents assess the (in-)tangible externalities that others might impose on them can strongly influence strategic interaction. This study explores mechanism design for agents whose externality assessments and private payoffs, exclusive of externalities, are all subject to asymmetric...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011773839

Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability

Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars H.; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 3, pp. 753-777

A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674186