We experimentally compare a simplified version of two mechanisms that implement the Shapley value as an (ex ante) equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: one proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996, H-MC) and the other by Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001, PC-W). While H-MC...

Introduction to Strategic Form Games -- Dominance -- Rationalizability -- Nash Equilibrium -- Perfect Equilibrium -- Evolutionary Stable Strategies -- Correlated Equilibrium -- Bayesian Nash Equilibrium -- Introduction to Extensive Form Games -- Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium -- Sequential...

This textbook introduces fundamental concepts of game theory and demonstrates its uses and application in the social sciences. Written in plain English and without overwhelming mathematical jargon, it serves as an invaluable resource for undergraduate students in economics, law, political...

This book uses game theory to analyze the strategies developed in negotiation processes. Offering a detailed analysis of competition and cooperation, it explores various bargaining strategies that result from the application of Nash equilibrium and mixed strategies. Employing a blend of game...

In the literature the outcome of contests is either interpreted as win probabilities or as shares of the prize. With this in mind, we examine two approaches to contest success functions. In the first we analyze the implications of contestants' incomplete information concerning the 'type' of the...

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however, instead of alternating offers, we have simultaneous payoff demands. We focus in the producer game he studies. Each player is chosen with equal probability. If that is the case,...