A central result in the literature on bargaining with asymmetric information is that the uninformed party (buyer) can screen the informed party (seller) over time. Screening eliminates trade failures that are otherwise common in the presence of adverse selection, but the downside of the...

The power to influence the allocation of resources in coalitional bargaining stems from an agent's ability to form multiple majority coalitions (pivotality) or from the relative vote share the agent contributes to a coalition (proportionality). We distinguish between coalitional commitment,...

Negotiations typically involve multiple issues: in addition to the transaction price, bargainers need to determine the scope of an agreement. We design a lab experiment to study behavior across different information and bargaining structures in a multi-issue context. Consistent with recent...

Theoretical research on claims problems has concentrated on normative properties and axiomatizations of solution concepts. We complement these analyses by empirical evidence on the predictability of three classical solution concepts in a bankruptcy problem. We examine both people's impartial...