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Handbook of game theory ; Volume 4

Young, H. Peyton (ed.); Zamir, Shemuʾel (ed.) - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011484738

The emergence of classes in a multi-agent bargaining model

Axtell, Robert L.; Epstein, Joshua M.; Young, H. Peyton - In: Social dynamics, (pp. 191-211). 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001602880

Equilibrium selection in bargaining models

Binmore, Ken; Samuelson, Larry; Young, H. Peyton - In: Games and economic behavior 45 (2003) 2, pp. 296-328

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001826437

Equilibrium selection in bargaining models

Binmore, Ken (contributor); Samuelson, Larry (contributor); … - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001757841

Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics

Wallace, Christopher; Young, H. Peyton - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011498303

Equilibrium Selection in Bargaining Models

Binmore, Ken; Samuelson, Larry; Young, H. Peyton - 2003

This paper examines evolutionary equilibrium selection in bargaining models. We show that random best-response and continuous best-response learning dynamics give rise to (different) simple sufficient conditions for identifying outcomes as stochastically stable. This allows us to characterize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014086939