Similar Search Results

Observable strategies, commitments, and contracts

Wärneryd, Karl Erik - 2014

We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent's rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010437999

Existence of steady-state equilibria in matching models with search frictions

Lauermann, Stephan; Nöldeke, Georg - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010499806

Reference points, social norms, and fairness in contract renegotiations : conference paper

Bartling, Björn; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2013

-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant … threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to strategically equivalent bargaining situations … in which no ex ante contract was written. The ex ante contract causes sellers to ask for markups that are 45 percent …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010342843

Delegation with incomplete and renegotiable contracts

Gerratana, Emanuele; Koçkesen, Levent - 2008 - This version: April 2008

It is well known that delegating the play of a game to an agent via incentive contracts may serve as a commitment device and hence provide a strategic advantage. Previous literature has shown that any Nash equilibrium outcome of an extensive-form principals-only game can be supported as a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012001777

Renegotiation of long‐term contracts as part of an implicit agreement

Kostadinov, Rumen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1471-1512

contract renegotiation is a powerful tool for incentive provision, despite the stationarity of the environment. Continuation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806553

Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium

Okada, Akira - In: Games and economic behavior 128 (2021), pp. 193-201

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012672078

Price Setting in a Decentralized Market and the Competitive Outcome

Lauermann, Stephan - 2018

This paper studies a decentralized, dynamic matching and bargaining market: buyers and sellers are matched into pairs. Traders exit the market at a constant rate, inducing search costs (frictions). All price offers are made by sellers. Despite the fact that sellers have all the bargaining power...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014219803

Pairing games and markets

Alkan, Ahmet; Tuncay, Alparslan - 2014

Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010350435

Price setting in a decentralized market and the competitive outcome

Lauermann, Stephan (contributor) - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003730623

Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market

Bester, Helmut - 2021

This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders’ fairness attitudes. In equilibrium fairness matters because of market...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587476