The reactive bargaining set (Granot(1994)) is the set of outcomes for which no justified objection exists. Here, in a justified objection the objector first watches how the target tries to act (if he has such an option), and then reacts by making a profit and ruining the target's attempt to...

This paper analyzes an ongoing bargaining situation in which preferences evolve over time and the previous agreement becomes the next status quo, determining the payoffs until a new agreement is reached. We show that the endogeneity of the status quo induces perverse incentives that exacerbate...

I study the evolutionary stability of 'mildly responsive' behavioural rules in a bargaining game. Individuals in a population (that may be finite or be described by individuals distributed uniformly over a continuum of fixed mass) bargain with all other individuals in a pair-wise manner over a...

I study the process of bargaining over a pie of fixed size under the Nash demand game protocol. Motivated by the argument that the manner in which bargaining unfolds often depends on antecedents, I embed the bargaining process in a recurrent framework where individuals obtain random samples from...

Case studies of cartels and recent theory suggest that repeated communication is key for stable cooperation in environments where signals about others' actions are noisy. However, empirically the exact role of communication is not well understood. We study cooperation under different monitoring...

There has been a long debate on equilibrium characterization in the negotiation model when players have different time preferences. We show that players behave quite differently under different time preferences than under common time preferences. Conventional analysis in this literature relies...

If bargainers can make credible commitments, they may want to threaten to reject low offers, promise to accept high offers, or both, prior to bargaining negotiations. We show that the timing of commitment attempts influences the goal of the commitments and the likelihood that incompatible...

Two deviations of alternating-offer bargaining behavior from economic theory are observed together, yet have been studied separately. Players who could secure themselves a large surplus share if bargainers were purely self-interested incompletely exploit their advantage. Delay in agreement...

We study the alternating-offers bargaining problem of assigning an indivisible and commonly valued object to one of two players in return for some payment among players. The players are asymmetrically informed about the object's value and have veto power over any settlement. There is no...

We study the alternating-offer bargaining problem of sharing a common value pie under incomplete information on both sides and no depreciation between two identical players. We characterise the essentially unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game which turns out to be in gradually...