Experimental studies show that the Nash equilibrium and its refinements are poor predictors of behavior in non-cooperative strategic games. Cooperation models, such as ERC and inequality aversion, yield superior predictions compared to the standard game theory predictions. However, those models...

Case studies of cartels and recent theory suggest that repeated communication is key for stable cooperation in environments where signals about others' actions are noisy. However, empirically the exact role of communication is not well understood. We study cooperation under different monitoring...

Two deviations of alternating-offer bargaining behavior from economic theory are observed together, yet have been studied separately. Players who could secure themselves a large surplus share if bargainers were purely self-interested incompletely exploit their advantage. Delay in agreement...

This textbook introduces fundamental concepts of game theory and demonstrates its uses and application in the social sciences. Written in plain English and without overwhelming mathematical jargon, it serves as an invaluable resource for undergraduate students in economics, law, political...

The reactive bargaining set (Granot(1994)) is the set of outcomes for which no justified objection exists. Here, in a justified objection the objector first watches how the target tries to act (if he has such an option), and then reacts by making a profit and ruining the target's attempt to...

This paper analyzes an ongoing bargaining situation in which preferences evolve over time and the previous agreement becomes the next status quo, determining the payoffs until a new agreement is reached. We show that the endogeneity of the status quo induces perverse incentives that exacerbate...

I study the evolutionary stability of 'mildly responsive' behavioural rules in a bargaining game. Individuals in a population (that may be finite or be described by individuals distributed uniformly over a continuum of fixed mass) bargain with all other individuals in a pair-wise manner over a...