We study the framing effects of communication in multiparty bargaining. Communication has been shown to be more truthful and revealing than predicted in equilibrium. Because talk is preference-revealing, it may effectively frame bargaining around a logic of fairness or competition, moving...

In the literature the outcome of contests is either interpreted as win probabilities or as shares of the prize. With this in mind, we examine two approaches to contest success functions. In the first we analyze the implications of contestants' incomplete information concerning the 'type' of the...

I analyze a sequential bargaining model in which players are optimistic about their bargaining power (measured as the probability of making offers), but learn as they play the game. I show that there exists a uniquely predetermined settlement date, such that in equilibrium the players always...

To analyze players' strategic alliance behavior, we introduce a new noncooperative coalitional bargaining model, in which each player can buy out other players with upfront transfers. We uncover the role of an essential player in a transferable utility game, or a veto player in a simple game, in...

This chapter surveys the past applications of game theory to the study of terrorism. By capturing the strategic interplay between terrorists and targeted governments, game theory is an appropriate methodology for investigating terrorism and counterterrorism. Game theory has been used to examine...

This paper analyzes strategic bargaining in negotiations between non-monolithic players, i.e., agents starting negotiations can split up in smaller entities during the bargaining process. We show that the possibility of scission in the informed coalition implies that it loses its information...

I study the role of the negotiation protocol in two-issues bargaining between two players, in which the pie only exists if both players contribute to its creation. The issues are the fraction of the pie, and the second is the pie itself, modeled as which project to choose. I examine three...

We examine how natural resource location, rent sharing and fighting capacities of different groups matter for ethnic conflict. A new type of bargaining failure due to multiple types of potential conflicts (and hence multiple threat points) is identified. The theory predicts conflict to be more...

Two partners try to dissolve a partnership that owns an asset of ambiguous value, where the value is determined ex post by a draw from an Ellsberg urn. In a within-subject experiment, subjects make decisions in three different bargaining mechanisms: unstructured bargaining, the Texas shoot-out,...