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Strategic and social pre-play communication in the ultimatum game

Zultan, Ro'i - In: Journal of economic psychology : research in economic … 33 (2012) 3, pp. 425-434

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009703992

Let the Dummy talk! : Unilateral communication and discrimination in three-person dictator experiments

Greiner, Ben; Güth, Werner; Zultan, Ro'i - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003006208

Unilateral face-to-face communication in ultimatum bargaining : a video experiment

Schmidt, Carsten; Zultan, Ro'i - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002245520

The uncontrolled social utility hypothesis revisited

Schmidt, Carsten; Zultan, Ro'i - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015204594

Collusion and information revelation in auctions

Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Zultan, Ro'i - In: European economic review : EER 95 (2017), pp. 84-102

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011812010

Collusion and information revelation in auctions

Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Zultan, Ro'i - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011655074

The uncontrolled social utility hypothesis revisited

Schmidt, Carsten - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013443253

A simple bargaining mechanism that elicits truthful reservation prices

Brams, Steven J.; Kaplan, Todd R.; Kilgour, D. Marc - In: Group decision and negotiation 24 (2015) 3, pp. 401-413

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010533313

A Simple Bargaining Mechanism that Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices

Brams, Steven J.; Kaplan, Todd R.; Kilgour, D. Marc - 2012

We describe a simple 2-stage mechanism whereby for two bargainers, a Buyer and a Seller, it is a weakly dominant strategy to report their reservation prices in the 1st stage. If the Buyer reports a higher price than the Seller, then the referee announces that there is the possibility for trade,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014043989