We develop a model of assignment games with pairwise-identitydependent externalities. A concept of conjectural …

This chapter surveys recent models of coalition and network formation in a unified framework. Comparisons are drawn … among various procedures of network and coalition formation, involving simultaneous and sequential moves. The survey also … discussion of efficient network and coalition formation procedures and directions for future research. …

This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to …

This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to …

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however … chosen with equal probability. If that is the case, she can choose any coalition she belongs to. However, a coalition can …

efficient, regardless of externalities created by interim actions. Otherwise, in the presence of externalities on outside … the distribution of coalitional gains and the dynamics of coalition formation in four illustrative applications …

coalition formation. It allows to make an explicit distinction between within-group and outside-group deviation options. This … the bargaining set containing a minimal winning coalition are characterized. Furthermore, it is shown that the bargaining … set of any homogeneous weighted majority game contains an outcome for which the underlying coalition structure consists of …

encompasses many economic models with externalities and outside options. We show that when outside options are pure (i … distribution of coalitional gains and the dynamics of coalition formation are characterized in four illustrative applications. …

externalities are more positive, there exists a grand-coalition SSPE of the bargaining game for any discount factor. However, if the … separately, considering wage contract externalities. We show that if the two workers are sufficiently complementary or if … two workers are sufficiently substitutable, there is no grand-coalition SSPE for any discount factor. In addition, we …