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Information sharing and bargaining in buyer-seller networks

Priazhkina, Sofia; Page, Frank H. - 2016

This paper presents a model of strategic buyer-seller networks with information exchange between sellers. Prior to engaging in bargaining with buyers, sellers can share access to buyers for a negotiated transfer. We study how this information exchange affects overall market prices, volumes and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011576406

Characterization of Stable Manea Bargaining Networks

O'Donnell, Joshua - 2016

This paper examines conditions for stability in bargaining networks. Network formation is endogenized and payoffs are … internalize the entire network structure when choosing trading partners. The set of link stable networks is characterized for all …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013002376

Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks

Gauer, Florian - 2014

We analyze a model of strategic network formation prior to a Manea (2011) bargaining game: ex-ante homogeneous players … form an undirected network with explicit linking costs anticipating expected equilibrium payoffs from the subsequent … sequential network bargaining. Assuming patient players, we provide a complete characterization of networks being pairwise (Nash …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010458499

Multilateral bargaining in networks : on the prevalence of inefficiencies

Lee, Joosung - 2015

We introduce a noncooperative multilateral bargaining model for a network-restricted environment, in which players can … their communication links with upfront transfers. The main theorem characterizes a condition on network structures for … efficient equilibria and shows the prevalence of strategic delays. If the underlying network is either complete or circular …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279698

Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks

Gauer, Florian - 2015 - First Version: December 2014, This Version: July 2015

We analyze a model of strategic network formation prior to a Manea (2011) bargaining game: ex-ante homogeneous players … form costly undirected links anticipating expected equilibrium payoffs from the subsequent network bargaining. Assuming …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011296326

Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks

Agbaglah, Messan; Ehlers, Lars H. - 2010

; Cover Function ; Bargaining ; Symmetric Game ; Network …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008737140

Overlapping Coalitions, Bargaining and Networks

Agbaglah, Messan; Ehlers, Lars H. - 2010

This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibrium. We show the existence of subgame perfect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014190389

When Rationality and Fairness Conflict : The Role of Cognitive-Control in the Ultimatum Game

Halali, Eliran; Bereby-Meyer, Yoella; Meiran, Nachshon - 2011

The ultimatum game models social exchange in situations in which the rational motive to maximize gains conflicts with fairness considerations. Using two independent behavioral measurements, the authors tested two contradicting predictions: that the preference for fairness is a deliberative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014181014

Dominant Strategy Implementation of Bargaining Solutions

Mizukami, Hideki; Wakayama, Takuma - 2020

We consider the problem where agents bargain over their shares of a perfectly divisible commodity. The aim of this paper is to identify the class of bargaining solutions induced by dominant strategy implementable allocation rules. To this end, we characterize the class of dominant strategy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014041039

Efficient Coalitional Bargaining with Noncontingent Offers II : Sequential Proposer Protocol

Chaturvedi, Rakesh - 2017

A new feature pertaining to proposer's ability to implement offers is introduced in the extensive form bargaining mechanism studied in Chatterjee et. al. (1993). This mechanism is used to analyze two classes of coalitional games with transferable utility. One class is that of strictly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012963352