We study social learning in a large population of agents who only observe the actions taken by their neighbours. Agents have to choose one, out of two, reversible actions, each optimal in one, out of two, unknown states of the world. Each agent chooses rationally, on the basis of private...

We study the problem of a policymaker who seeks to set policy optimally in an economy where the true economic structure is unobserved, and he optimally learns from observations of the economy. This is a classic problem of learning and control, variants of which have been studied in the past, but...

We study the problem of a policymaker who seeks to set policy optimally in an economy where the true economic structure is unobserved, and policymakers optimally learn from their observations of the economy. This is a classic problem of learning and control, variants of which have been studied...

We study the problem of a policymaker who seeks to set policy optimally in an economy where the true economic structure is unobserved, and he optimally learns from observations of the economy. This is a classic problem of learning and control, variants of which have been studied in the past, but...

This paper estimates a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for the European Monetary Union by using Bayesian techniques. A salient feature of the model is an extension of the typically postulated quadratic cost structure for the monopolistic choice of price variables. As shown in...

Taking as data-generation process a standard DSGE model, we show via Monte Carlo that reliably detecting hysteresis, defined as the presence of aggregate demand shocks with a permanent impact on output, is a significant challenge, as model-consistent identification schemes (i) spuriously detect...

We search for the presence of hysteresis, which we define as aggregate demand shocks that have a permanent impact on real GDP, in the U.S., the Euro Area, and the U.K. Working with cointegrated structural VARs, we find essentially no evidence of such effects. Within a Classical statistical...