Two firms produce substitute goods with unknown quality. At each stage the firms set prices and a consumer with private information and unit demand buys from one of the firms. Both firms and consumers see the entire history of prices and purchases. Will such markets aggregate information? Will...

We consider a multi-receiver Bayesian persuasion problem where an informed sender tries to persuade a group of receivers to adopt a certain product. The sender is allowed to commit to a signaling policy where she sends a private signal to every receiver. The utility of the sender is a function...

We analyze boundedly rational updating in a repeated interaction network model with binary actions and binary states. Agents form beliefs according to discretized DeGroot updating and apply a decision rule that assigns a (mixed) action to each belief. We first show that under weak assumptions...

We study a canonical setting of learning in networks where initially agents receive conditionally i.i.d. signals about a binary state. The distribution according to which signals are drawn is called an information structure. Agents repeatedly communicate beliefs with their neighbors and update...

Mean-preserving contractions are critical for studying Bayesian models of information design. We introduce the class of bi-pooling policies, and the class of bi-pooling distributions as their induced distributions over posteriors. We show that every extreme point in the set of all...