This paper studies an infinitely repeated auction when the stage game involves negative externalities among buyers, that is, a buyer is worse off if another rival wins the good rather than if nobody wins it. It is first shown in the stage game that a cartel must be more inclusive if it wishes to...

We provide a toolkit for efficient online estimation of heterogeneous agent (HA) New Keynesian (NK) models based on Sequential Monte Carlo methods. We use this toolkit to compare the out-of-sample forecasting accuracy of a prominent HANK model, Bayer et al. (2022), to that of the representative...

We provide a toolkit for efficient online estimation of heterogeneous agent (HA) New Keynesian (NK) models based on Sequential Monte Carlo methods. We use this toolkit to compare the out-of-sample forecasting accuracy of a prominent HANK model, Bayer et al. (2022), to that of the representative...