This supplementary appendix covers all the proofs that were skipped from the text or the appendix of Bayesian Comparative Statics (Mekonnen and Leal-Vizcaino, 2018). In particular, the proof for Corollary 1, Proposition 3, Theorem 2, and Theorem 3 are contained in this document. Several...

We study how changes to the informativeness of signals in Bayesian games and single-agent decision problems affect the distribution of equilibrium actions. A more precise private signal about an unknown state of the world leads to an mean-preserving spread of an agent's beliefs. Focusing on...

We study how information affects equilibria and welfare in games. For an agent, more precise information about an unknown state of the world leads to a mean-preserving spread of beliefs. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions to obtain either a non-increasing mean or a...

We study how changes to the informativeness of signals in Bayesian games and single‐agent decision problems affect the distribution of equilibrium actions. Focusing on supermodular environments, we provide conditions under which a more precise private signal for one agent leads to an...