This paper analyzes farsighted stable sets when agents have heterogeneous expectations over the dominance paths. We consider expectation functions satisfying two properties of path-persistence and consistency. We show that farsighted stable sets with heterogeneous expectations always exist and...

This paper analyzes farsighted stable sets when agents have heterogeneous expectations over the dominance paths. We consider expectation functions satisfying the two properties of justifiability and maximality and define stable alternatives as endpoints of the expectation function of some agent...

This paper analyzes farsighted stable sets when agents have heterogeneous expectations over the dominance paths. We consider expectation functions satisfying two properties of justifiability and maximality. We characterize singleton farsighted stable sets with heterogeneous expectations in...

This paper analyzes farsighted stable sets when agents have heterogeneous expectations over the dominance paths. We consider expectation functions satisfying two properties of path-persistence and consistency. We show that farsighted stable sets with heterogeneous expectations always exist and...

This paper analyzes farsighted stability when agents have heterogeneous expectations over the dominance paths. We consider expectation functions satisfying the two properties of justifiability and maximality and define stable alternatives as unique stationary points of the expectation function...

This paper analyzes farsighted stable sets when agents have heterogeneous expectations over the dominance paths. We consider expectation functions satisfying two properties of path-persistence and consistency. We show that farsighted stable sets with heterogeneous expectations always exist and...

In t-solutions, quantal response equilibria based on the linear probability model as introduced in R.W. Rosenthal (1989, Int. J. Game Theory 18, 273-292), choice probabilities are related to the determination of leveling taxes. The set of t-solutions coincides with the set of Nash equilibria of...