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Bounded rationality theories are typically characterized over exhaustive data sets. We develop a methodology to understand the empirical content of such theories with limited data, adapting the classic, revealed-preference approach to new forms of revealed information. We apply our approach to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014102031
Bounded rationality theories are typically characterized over exhaustive data sets. We develop a methodology to understand the empirical content of such theories with limited data, adapting the classic, revealed-preference approach to new forms of revealed information. We apply our approach to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587354
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013277445
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015074552
We consider mechanism design in contexts in which agents exhibit bounded depth of reasoning (level k) instead of rational expectations. We use simple direct mechanisms, in which agents report only first-order beliefs. While level 0 agents are assumed to be truth tellers, level k agents...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013051820
Among the most important and robust violations of rationality are the attraction and the compromise effects. The compromise effect refers to the tendency of individuals to choose an intermediate option in a choice set, while the attraction effect refers to the tendency to choose an option that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013158894
Among the most important and robust violations of rationality are the attraction and the compromise effects. The compromise effect refers to the tendency of individuals to choose an intermediate option in a choice set, while the attraction effect refers to the tendency to choose an option that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003897572
We consider mechanism design in contexts in which agents exhibit bounded depth of reasoning (level k ) instead of rational expectations. We use simple direct mechanisms, in which agents report only first-order beliefs. While level 0 agents are assumed to be truth tellers, level k agents...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010401721
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003880038
Models of choice where agents see others as less sophisticated than themselves have significantly different, sometimes more accurate, predictions in games than does Nash equilibrium. When it comes to mechanism design, however, they turn out to have surprisingly similar implications. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515723