We use a novel field experiment which jointly tests two implicit assumptions of updating models in a joint framework: that new information leads to new knowledge and that new knowledge can affect economic decisions. In the experiment, we elicit subjects’ prior knowledge state about a good’s...

We use a novel field experiment which jointly tests two implicit assumptions of updating models in a joint framework: that new information leads to new knowledge and that new knowledge can affect economic decisions. In the experiment, we elicit subjects’ prior knowledge state about a good’s...

In this study we elicit agents' prior information set regarding a public good, exogenously give information treatments to survey respondents and subsequently elicit willingness to pay for the good and posterior information sets. The design of this field experiment allows us to perform...

In this study we elicit agents’ prior information set regarding a public good, exogenously give information treatments to survey respondents and subsequently elicit willingness to pay for the good and posterior information sets. The design of this field experiment allows us to perform...