In prosocial decisions, decision-makers are inherently uncertain about how their decisions impact others’ utility – we call this interpersonal uncertainty. We show that people’s response to interpersonal uncertainty shapes well-known patterns of prosocial behavior. First, using standard...

We use a large and heterogeneous sample of the Danish population to investigate the importance of distributional preferences for behavior in a public good game and a trust game. We find robust evidence for the significant explanatory power of distributional preferences. In fact, compared to...

While most papers_new on team decision-making find teams to behave more selfish, less trusting and less altruistic than individuals, Cason and Mui (1997) report that teams are more altruistic than individuals in a dictator game. Using a within-subjects design we re-examine group polarization by...

We commonly think of information as an instrument for better decisions, yet evidence suggests that people often decline free information in non-strategic scenarios. This paper provides a theory for how a dynamically-consistent decision maker can be averse to partial information as a consequence...

We study in an experiment whether humans prefer to depend on decisions of other humans (social uncertainty) or states of nature (environmental uncertainty). In the social uncertainty treatments subjects depend only on past decisions of other humans. This is the first experiment that studies...

We compare inequality aversion in individuals and teams by means of both within- and between-subject experimental designs, and we investigate how teams aggregate individual preferences. We find that team decisions reveal less inequality aversion than individual initial proposals in team...

This paper investigates - in a large heterogeneous sample - the relationship between social preferences on the one hand, and socioeconomic factors and political preferences on the other hand. Socioeconomic factors correlate with social preferences, and social preferences robustly shape political...

We propose a model of instrumental belief choice under loss aversion. When new information arrives, an agent is prompted to abandon her prior. However, potential posteriors may induce her to take actions that generate a lower utility in some states than actions induced by her prior. These losses...

Using an approach based on evolution and adaptation, we provide foundations for a model of choice under uncertainty based on adaptive preferences, and we show that updating of those preferences in response to new information will respect dynamic consistency even at the cost of violating...