Using a model without conflicts of interest and with identical information available to equity analysts, we show that bias and herding in their stock recommendations occur due to incentives provided by relative performance evaluation and top awards. Furthermore, these incentives also lead to...

We solve analytically a pure exchange general equilibrium model of heterogeneous beliefs with habit forming preferences. Equilibrium prices depend on three factors: (i) the habit formation parameter; ii) the degree of disagreement; iii) the dynamics of disagreement. We show that in the absence...

We conduct a controlled laboratory experiment in which subjects dynamically choose to allocate their portfolio between (i) a safe asset, (ii) a risky asset and (iii) a skewed asset with negative expected value (a bet ), in an environment where they can sometimes choose to acquire some...

We solve analytically a pure exchange general equilibrium model with a continuum of agents that agree to disagree on how they interpret information. Disagreement fluctuates with information quality and the disagreement model is estimated using data on professional forecasts. We fi nd that...