If Cournot oligopolists may sell their output prior to its production (forward trading), competition intensifies. Potentially, it may intensify so far as to imply convergence to the Bertrand equilibrium, as shown by Allaz and Vila (1993) for the case of linear demand and costs. The present paper...

In many industries, firms pre-order input and forward sell output prior to the actual production period. It is known that forward buying input induces a “Cournot–Stackelberg endogeneity” (both Cournot and Stackelberg outcomes may result in equilibrium) and forward selling output induces a...

The possibility of forward trading has been shown to restore social efficiency in Cournot oligopolies if marginal costs are constant. The paper analyzes the more general case that marginal costs are non-decreasing. I show that increasing marginal costs diminish the “strategic...

This paper analyzes a T-stage model of oligopoly where firms build up capacity and conclude forward sales in stages tT, and they choose production quantities in t=T. We consider the case of n firms with asymmetric marginal costs. In the two-stage game, the set of outcomes is a...