Using data from Italian public works, we study whether and which procuring administrations manipulate the value of contracts to avoid crossing regulatory thresholds that limit discretion, and how this impacts procurement outcomes. We use bunching estimators to document substantial manipulation...

We study differently framed incentives in dynamic laboratory buyer-seller relationships with multi-tasking and endogenous matching. The experimental design tries to mitigate the role of social preferences and intrinsic motivation. Absent explicit incentives, effort is low in both tasks. Their...

We study how delivery times and prices for hospital medical devices respond to the introduction of centralized procurement. Our identification strategy leverages a legislative change in Italy that mandated centralized purchases for a sub-set of devices. The statutory centralization generated a...

We study how delivery times and prices for hospital medical devices respond to the introduction of centralized procurement. Our identification strategy leverages a legislative change in Italy that mandated centralized purchases for a sub-set of devices. The statutory centralization generated a...

Using a dataset of medical devices purchased by Italian Public Buyers (PBs), for each purchase, we measure the difference between each item's price and its marginal cost. We define PBs' ability in purchasing as PBs' fixed effect (FE) on that difference. We find that average prices vary...