We study reputation incentives in the director labor market and find that directors with multiple directorships distribute their effort unequally based on the directorship's relative prestige. When directors experience an exogenous increase in a directorship's relative ranking, their board...

I investigate firm financial management when the CFO has greater authority by being on the board and the corresponding changes when the CFO position leaves the board. After the 2002 regulatory changes on board composition requirements, determinants of CFO board membership shift from being driven...

In this paper, we examine the effects of board structure on a wide variety of corporate litigation. We use a unique hand-collected dataset of corporate lawsuits and the 2002 NYSE/NASDAQ exchange listing requirements, as an exogenous shock to board independence, to empirically examine the...

We examine overconfident CEO directors and find they attend more board meetings, are more likely to serve on the nominating or the compensation committee, have more independent directorships, and foster higher attendance rates on boards. Boards with overconfident directors are more likely to...