This paper revisits the staggered board debate focusing on the long-term association of firm value with changes in board structure. We find no evidence that staggered board changes are negatively related to firm value. However, we find a positive relation for firms engaged in innovation and...

This online appendix provides additional results as described in our paper "Staggered Boards and Long-Term Value, Revisited", available at 'http://ssrn.com/abstract=2364165' http://ssrn.com/abstract=2364165

In the last decade, the balance of power between shareholders and boards has shifted dramatically. Changes in both the marketplace and the legal landscape governing it have turned the call for empowered shareholders into a new reality. Correspondingly, the authority that boards of directors have...

Under current fiduciary rules, directors who fail to maintain an undivided loyalty to common shareholders are essentially “intruders,” exposed to shareholder retribution and liability for breach of fiduciary duty. This Article argues that the increasing appointment of “constituency...

We document the emergence of the lead independent director (LID) board role in a sample of U.S. firms in 1999-2015. We find that firms that adopt a LID board role are larger and have more independent boards, higher institutional investor holdings, and an NYSE listing. Firms with greater...

We examine the effect of board members with venture capital experience (i.e., VC directors) on executive incentives at non-VC-backed public firms. VC directors serving on the compensation committee are associated with greater CEO risk-taking incentives (i.e., vega) and pay-for-performance...

We examine the effect of board members with venture capital experience (i.e., VC directors) on executive incentives at publicly listed firms. VC directors serving on the compensation committee are associated with greater CEO risk-taking incentives (i.e., vega) and greater pay-for-performance...