When faced with budget-constrained bidders, all-pay auctions revenue-dominate standard auctions (Örst and second-price), which, in a competitive market, gives an edge to the all-pay format. An equilibrium in which sellers compete with standard auctions fails to exist if the all-pay format is...

When faced with budget-constrained bidders, all-pay auctions revenue-dominate standard auctions (Örst and second-price), which, in a competitive market, gives an edge to the all-pay format. An equilibrium in which sellers compete with standard auctions fails to exist if the all-pay format is...

We present an equilibrium search model of competing mechanisms where some buyers are budget constrained. Absent budget constraints, the existing literature capitulates that if buyers differ in their valuations then in the unique equilibrium all sellers hold second price auctions (e.g. McAfee...