This dissertation consists of two essays investigating the labor market for CEOs who have developed a reputation for being a turnaround specialist. Turnaround specialists are managers who have developed reputations for having skills and experience in reversing the fortunes of financially...

Family firms are an important part of the U.S. economy. Using a comprehensive sample of publicly traded family firms in the U.S. this dissertation looks into various aspects of their corporate structure. Specifically, this dissertation studies the industry distribution, capital structure...

This dissertation has three essays. In the first essay, I investigate whether the decision to repurchase stock is driven by investor demand for repurchases. Specifically, I hypothesize that firms cater to investor demand for repurchases by initiating repurchases when investors place premiums on...

This dissertation studies foreign firms shareholder value and earnings-related information measures in relation with the implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Chapter One addresses the value implications and empirically tests the changes in market values of foreign firms around SOX...

The corporate governance literature generally assumes that shareholders incentives to monitor management depend on how much of the firm the shareholders own. This dissertation proposes that another determinant of monitoring incentive is how long large shareholders intend to hold their shares,...

This study addresses the relation between the exit of venture capital and opportunistic behavior in financial disclosure. Specifically, I examine whether the exit of venture capital is associated with income-increasing earnings management in the IPO year and financial statement restatements...

Although Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) are potential value-creation opportunities, why they tend to occur in waves is a mystery to scholars and managers alike. Most models of M&A waves are unilevel, reductionist, and Gaussian, whereas wave patterns are arguably multi-level, emergent, and...

There are many reasons why managers are interested in maintaining control over their firm. Some potential reasons include compensation, autonomy, power, perquisites, and the ability to determine the terms under which the firm is acquired. This study examines one event that provides an...

Incentives of executives and board of directors play an important role in corporate decisions. Principal agent theory suggests a tradeoff between risk and incentives in optimal compensation contracts for managers. The first essay of this dissertation explores the relationship between the...

We extend the existing literature on the factors explaining the value of acquired firms by examining the effect of corporate governance and other characteristics of Japanese and U.S. acquirers on the long-term post-acquisition stock and accounting performance of their U.S. targets over 1980...