This paper provides a game-theoretic model of network formation with a continuous effort choice. Efforts are strategic complements for direct neighbors in the network and display global substitution/congestion effects. We show that if the parameter governing local strategic complements is larger...

This paper presents a model of strategic network formation with local complementarities in effort levels and positive local externalities. Results are obtained for a general class of payoff functions, which subsumes the linear-quadratic specification frequently used in the literature. We assume...

This paper presents a game-theoretic model of network formation, which allows agents to enter bilateral alliances and to extract payoffs from enemies. Each pair of agents creates a surplus of one, which allies divide in equal parts. If agents are enemies, then the agent with more allies obtains...

This paper presents a simple model of strategic network formation with local complementarities in effort levels and positive local externalities for a general class of payoff functions. Results are obtained for one-sided and two-sided link creation. In both cases (pairwise) Nash equilibrium...

This paper presents a game-theoretic model of network formation, which allows agents to enter bilateral alliances and to extract payoffs from enemies. Each pair of agents creates a surplus of one, which allies divide in equal parts. If agents are enemies, then the agent with more allies obtains...

This paper studies a central bank's optimal interest rate corridor choice in the presence of an endogenous interbank network. We first provide a characterization of the unique equilibrium of banks' liquidity holdings for any network of credit lines. Then, we endogenize the network and show that...