We consider a class of cooperative network games with transferable utilities in which players interact through a probabilistic network rather than a regular, deterministic network. In this class of wealth-generating situations we consider probabilistic extensions of the Myerson value and the...

We consider a multimarket framework where a set of firms compete on two interrelated oligopolistic markets. Prior to competing in these markets, firms can spy on others in order to increase the quality of their product. We characterize the equilibrium espionage networks and networks that...

In this note, we extend the Goyal and Joshi's model of network of collaboration in oligopoly to multi-market situations. We examine the incentive of firms to form links and the architectures of the resulting equilibrium networks in this setting. We also present some results on efficient networks

We introduce a new network centrality measure founded on the Gately value for cooperative games with transferable utilities. A directed network is interpreted as representing control or authority relations between players-constituting a hierarchical network. The power distribution embedded...

We consider an economy in which agents are embedded in a network of potential value-generating relationships. Agents are assumed to be able to participate in three types of economic interactions: Autarkic self-provision; bilateral interaction; and multilateral collaboration. We introduce two...

In this paper we model the formation of directed communication networks. A directed communication network is represented by a directed graph. Firstly, we study an allocation rule satisfying two appealing properties, component efficiency and directed fairness. We show that such an allocation rule...