In strictly competitive games, equilibrium mixed strategies are invariant to changes in the ultimate prizes. Dixit & Skeath (1999) argue that this seems counter-intuitive. We show that this invariance is robust to dropping the independence axiom, but is removed if we drop the reduction axiom.

Представлен обзор современных исследований, посвященных применению методов теории игр для анализа различных аспектов инновационной деятельности....

In this paper, we prove that the concept of value traditionally defined in the class of two-person zero-sum games can be adequately generalized to the class of n-person weakly unilaterally competitive games introduced by Kats & Thisse [KT92b]. We subsequently establish that if there exists an...

In strictly competitive games, equilibrium mixed strategies are invariant to changes in the ultimate prizes. Dixit & Skeath (1999) argue that this seems counter-intuitive. We show that this invariance is robust to dropping the independence axiom, but is removed if we drop the reduction axiom.

We consider a multi-stage game where firms first choose product quality and then compete for sales in the product market. We show how the equilibrium qualities depend on the timing of quality choices and on the form of competition at the sale stages. If the product market is characterized by...

We propose a simple model of competition for the production of energy between a thermal station and an hydrostation. We show analytically and geometrically that, despite its static characteristics, the output from the thermal station is determined by the intertemporal specifications of costs and...