A full understanding of public affairs requires the ability to distinguish between the policies that voters would like the government to adopt, and the influence that different voters or groups of voters actually exert in the democratic process. We consider the properties of a computable...

In strictly competitive games, equilibrium mixed strategies are invariant to changes in the ultimate prizes. Dixit & Skeath (1999) argue that this seems counter-intuitive. We show that this invariance is robust to dropping the independence axiom, but is removed if we drop the reduction axiom.

Представлен обзор современных исследований, посвященных применению методов теории игр для анализа различных аспектов инновационной деятельности....

In this paper, we prove that the concept of value traditionally defined in the class of two-person zero-sum games can be adequately generalized to the class of n-person weakly unilaterally competitive games introduced by Kats & Thisse [KT92b]. We subsequently establish that if there exists an...

In strictly competitive games, equilibrium mixed strategies are invariant to changes in the ultimate prizes. Dixit & Skeath (1999) argue that this seems counter-intuitive. We show that this invariance is robust to dropping the independence axiom, but is removed if we drop the reduction axiom.