Автор рассматривает предпосылки конкурентного поведения предпринимательских структур и на их основе выделяет два типа конкурентных действий. Инновационный...

In strictly competitive games, equilibrium mixed strategies are invariant to changes in the ultimate prizes. Dixit & Skeath (1999) argue that this seems counter-intuitive. We show that this invariance is robust to dropping the independence axiom, but is removed if we drop the reduction axiom.

Successful individuals were frequently found to be overly optimistic. These finding are puzzling, as one could expect that realists would perform best in the long run. We show, however, that in a large class of strategic interactions of either cooperation or competition, the equilibrium payoffs...

The aim of this paper is to propose a model that describes the strategic choices adopted by the firms in the competitive structure of multimedia industry. From a sample of competitors in three large activities of the multimedia (audio-visual, telecommunications, data processing) we build an...

We derive from Bernis [2000] a strategic mechanism which fully implements the set of competitive equilibria on a dynamically incomplete reinsurance market VIA Nash equilibria. The mechanism is feasible, and such that the set of coalition proof Nash equilibria coincides with that of Nash...

This contribution investigates the effectiveness and welfare implications of fiscal policies in a context of multilateral trade, when traders behave strategically. The present approach deals simultaneously with two aspects of fiscal policies: collecting resources for redistributive purposes and...

We investigate the effectiveness of tax and transfer policies in correcting market distortions when the economy is imperfectly competitive. We perform this analysis in the context of an exchange model representing a bilateral oligopoly situation, which constitutes a particular example of a...

In this paper, we prove that the concept of value traditionally defined in the class of two-person zero-sum games can be adequately generalized to the class of n-person weakly unilaterally competitive games introduced by Kats & Thisse [KT92b]. We subsequently establish that if there exists an...

The deterring role of the medium of payment in a takeover contest is analyzed from the point of view of the bidder. Cash, debt and equity are considered as alternative mediums of payment, and the bidder equilibrium strategies are specified following the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium requirements...