Extrinsic uncertainty is effective at a competitive equilibrium. This is generic if spot markets are inoperative: the only objects of exchange are assets for the contingent delivery of commodities; and the asset market is incomplete. The structure of payoffs of assets may allow for non-trivial...

In strictly competitive games, equilibrium mixed strategies are invariant to changes in the ultimate prizes. Dixit & Skeath (1999) argue that this seems counter-intuitive. We show that this invariance is robust to dropping the independence axiom, but is removed if we drop the reduction axiom.

The endogeneity of preferences implies that not only individual preferences -along with technologies, government policies, and the organization of society and markets- determine economic outcomes, but also that the economic, social, legal, and cultural structure of society affects preferences....

In this paper, it is shown, in the general case, that a multiple causes death model is equivalent to a competing independent risks model.

We derive from Bernis [2000] a strategic mechanism which fully implements the set of competitive equilibria on a dynamically incomplete reinsurance market VIA Nash equilibria. The mechanism is feasible, and such that the set of coalition proof Nash equilibria coincides with that of Nash...

In strictly competitive games, equilibrium mixed strategies are invariant to changes in the ultimate prizes. Dixit & Skeath (1999) argue that this seems counter-intuitive. We show that this invariance is robust to dropping the independence axiom, but is removed if we drop the reduction axiom.

This paper considers irreversible investment in competing research projects with uncertain returns under a winner-takes-all patent system. Uncertainty takes two distinct forms: the technological success of the project is probabilistic, while the economic value of the patent to be won evolves...

We consider a model in which customers sequentially negotiate nonexclusive credit or insurance contracts from multiple risk-neutral firms in a market with free entry. Each contract is subject to moral hazard arising from a common noncontractible effort decision.