I uncover a new force towards increasing dominance. The new effect results from the strategic choice of covariance in races. I assume that players must choose not the amount of resources to spend but how to allocate those resources. I show that the laggard has an incentive to chose a different...

We consider a multi-stage game where firms first choose product quality and then compete for sales in the product market. We show how the equilibrium qualities depend on the timing of quality choices and on the form of competition at the sale stages. If the product market is characterized by...

Extrinsic uncertainty is effective at a competitive equilibrium. This is generic if spot markets are inoperative: the only objects of exchange are assets for the contingent delivery of commodities; and the asset market is incomplete. The structure of payoffs of assets may allow for non-trivial...

Successful individuals were frequently found to be overly optimistic. These finding are puzzling, as one could expect that realists would perform best in the long run. We show, however, that in a large class of strategic interactions of either cooperation or competition, the equilibrium payoffs...

Information technology has altered the way companies manage their supply chains, and has resulted in a variety of new inter-organizational logistics management approaches. Many partners who are adjacent on the supply chain can both gain from sharing information that was previously accessible to...

Introducing the concept of innovation capital we will analyse conditions under which a national industry is able to succeed in international Schumpeterian competition. Then we will discuss the significance of this concept for the economic development of the German plastics industry from the...

The interaction of insurance and the market for physician services is considered in a model where imperfectly informed consumers rely on doctors for advice on the utilization of services and there is monopolistic competition among physicians on the basis of price and the quality of their advice....

We consider a homogenous good oligopoly with identical consumers who learn about prices either by (sequentially) visiting firms or by consulting a price agency who sells information about which firm charges the lowest price.

This paper reverses the standard conclusion that asymmetric information plus competition results in insufficient insurance provision. Risk-tolerant individuals take few precautions and are disinclined to insure, but are drawn into a pooling equilibrium by the low premiums created by the presence...