This paper evaluates alternative strategic models of competition and market structure in online retailing, and makes comparisons with traditional retailing. Online consumers are less concerned than traditional consumers about spatial characteristics and more concerned about hidden quality...

This paper analyzes the problem of altering the cost structure within an oligopoly, in the presence of costs of manipulation. Oligopolistic firms (which differ from each other in production costs) compete a la Cournot in the second stage, taking as given firm-specific taxes or input prices. In...

We study the effects of a decrease in trade costs on the spatial distribution of industry in a multi-regional economy, when a rise in the regional population of workers generates higher urban costs. We show that high and low trade costs imply that all regions involve a positive share of the...

This paper analyzes the problem of altering the cost structure within an oligopoly, in the presence of costs of manipulation. Oligopolistic firms (which differ from each other in production costs) compete a la Cournot in the second stage, taking as given firm-specific taxees or input prices. In...

A two-stage game is used in this paper to model a long-run market with spatially separated producers and with multi-period demands: first, firmas simultaneously and independently invest their capacities; second, after capacities are set up in the first stage and made public, firms engage in a...

This paper considers a model of district formation that incorporates a notion of regional industrial systems. Each firm chooses its location from the set of existing industrial districts. The heterogeneous firms are distinguished by its "stand alone" district-dependent production and...

This paper presents a model of a vertically organized distribution network of illicit drugs with traffickers and retailers. The key assumption is the non-linear transactions costs related to the risk undergone by drugs sellers.

We consider the impact of the cost paradox on the likelihood of cooperative firms to use a cost reducing Research Joint Venture (RJV) to increase research levels when spillovers are large.

It is shown that even when vertical integration leads to an upstream monopoly, welfare can improve if the ex ante market share of the merging firm is large. This result is obtained in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium context with asymmetric marginal costs of production.

In this paper, we study the effects of introducing endogenous costs in a Tullock model of rent-seeking. We show that unions can be efficiency improving, and that the firms' level of effort depends more critically upon the number of firms participating in the contests when unions are present. We...