This study examines the relationship between corporate managers' political ideology and corporate leverage policies conditional on investor sentiment. Based on a minimum of 21,884 observations over the 1992-2008 period, the authors show that Republican managers significantly reduce leverage...

We administer psychometric tests to senior executives to obtain evidence on their underlying psychological traits and attitudes. We find US CEOs differ significantly from non-US CEOs in terms of their underlying attitudes. In addition, we find that CEOs are significantly more optimistic and...

This paper introduces the Journal of Multinational Financial Management's special issue on financial management in China. We provide a brief literature review of China's financial management policies, practices, and recent research findings, and describe how papers published in this special...

We survey 79 private equity (PE) investors with combined assets under management of more than $750 billion about their practices in firm valuation, capital structure, governance, and value creation. Investors rely primarily on internal rates of return and multiples to evaluate investments. Their...

We examine cash holdings and leverage levels of German listed (non-financial and non-utility) firms. We document a secular increase in cash ratios over the last twenty years (1992–2011), reducing the net debt book leverage ratio for the average sample firm close to zero. Using pre-diction...

Stronger creditor rights reduce credit costs and thus may allow firms to increase leverage and investments, but also increase distress costs and thus may prompt firms to lower leverage and undertake risk-reducing but unprofitable investments. Using a German bankruptcy law reform, on average, we...

Leveraged buyouts allow for a separate identification of sponsor reputation and underlying firm quality and their effects on capital structure choices. In 616 U.S. LBOs for which we can reconstruct financing activity, we find that the average LBO issues an average of 1.16 additional debt...