The aim of this paper is to analyze the equilibrium default risk in a two-stage duopoly model, where firms decide their financial structure in the first stage of the game and take their output market decisions in the second stage of the game. Using the framework of Brander and Lewis (1986) we...

We study the interactions between the capital structure and the technological flexibility choices of firms in a duopoly. When there are bankruptcy costs, a leveraged firm may modify its strategic choices in order to decrease its probability of bankruptcy. We show that, when the capacity level of...

In capital intensive industries, firms face complicated multi-stage financing, investment, and production decisions under the watchful eye of existing and potential industry rivals. We consider a two-stage simplification of this environment. In the first stage, an incumbent firm benefits from...

This paper develops a general framework to analyze the relationship between a firm's capital structure and its product market strategy and presents a taxonomy of whether debt makes a firm {\it tough} or {\it soft} in product market competition and how strategic considerations affect the leverage...

This paper empirically investigates the effect of leverage on strategic preemption. Using new data on entry plans and incumbent investments from the American casino industry, I find that high leverage prevents incumbents from responding to entry threats. Facing the same set of entry plans, low...

This paper studies strategic behavior in product markets with asymmetric information. A real options model is developed to investigate information revelation and signaling role capital structure. Information revelation is ensured through a learning mechanism that stems from the real options...

We show how product market competition affects capital structure by developing a tractable model that embeds the tradeoff between the tax benefits and bankruptcy costs of debt in an industry equilibrium setting with heterogeneous, imperfectly competitive firms. Different determinants of...

Capital structure and financial policies can raise anticompetitive concerns to the extent that they induce rival firms to compete less aggressively. In contrast to common ownership, anticompetitive concerns triggered by financial leverage being ratcheted up in parallel across rival firms can be...

A firm's leverage increases its bargaining power and reduces suppliers' relation-specific investment, and so does competition among suppliers. We explore the interaction between leverage and supplier competition, and find that firm leverage decreases with the degree of competition among...