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A bidding ring is a collection of bidders who collude in an auction in order to gain greater surplus by depressing competition. This entry describes some typical bidding rings and provides an introduction to the related theoretical and empirical literature.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009395646
-shot competitive interactions, like Bertrand oligopolies and first-price auctions, where no collusion would be supportable otherwise … reduce or at best cancel sanctions for price-fixing firms that self-report -- may make collusion enforceable even in one …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608616
We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012507333
colluding agents can be used to reduce the revenue losses from collusion. In a class of environments we show that the principal … optimal mechanisms can be implemented as uniquely collusion-proof mechanisms. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011700241
decreases with repetition. Theory predicts that repetition facilitates collusion among sellers in procurement auctions, while … activities. We use an economic experiment to examine whether the market efficiency of conservation auctions increases or … effects, the latter has the upper hand; average bids decrease monotonically over the consecutive auctions. Since repetition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932593
This paper explores the impact of debarment as a deterrent of collusion in first-price procurement auctions. We develop … both reduce collusion and bids. The deterrent effect of debarment increases in its length. However, the debarment of … reduction resulting from debarment may trigger tacit collusion. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011822812
behavior in an environment with repeated auctions, pivotal suppliers and inelastic demand. The price increase can be traced … back to an abuse of the auction’s pay-as-bid mechanism by the two largest firms. In contrast to theoretical findings, we … show that pay-as-bid auctions do not necessarily reduce incentives for strategic capacity withholding and collusive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751726
The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of … collusion in first-price and second-price auctions. Furthermore, failed collusion attempts distort the bidding behavior in the … neglects the effects of failed collusion attempts. In such contingencies, information revealed in the negotiation process is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010472820
We describe the economics literature on auction markets, with an emphasis on the connection between theory, empirical practice, and public policy, and a discussion of outstanding issues. We describe some basic concepts, to highlight some strengths and weaknesses of the literature, and so...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024584
We study the relationship between collusion and corruption in a stylized model of repeated procurement where the cost … suppliers alleviates free-riding in reporting. However, it also facilitates collusion in bidding by increasing the value of the … collusive rent. In turn, bidding collusion facilitates cooperation in reporting by increasing the value of having honest …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012697250