Introductory Remarks for the Panel Discussion Sponsored by the Heller-Hurwicz Economics Institute and the Economic Club of Minnesota at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.

Comments at the 10th Anniversary of CLS, New York City.

Comments at the 10th Anniversary of CLS, New York City.

Introductory Remarks for the Panel Discussion Sponsored by the Heller-Hurwicz Economics Institute and the Economic Club of Minnesota at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.

This paper proposes a simple framework for analyzing a continuum of monetary policy rules characterized by differing degrees of credibility, in which commitment and discretion become special cases of what we call quasi commitment. The monetary policy authority is assumed to formulate optimal...

The volatility patterns of overnight interest rates differ across industrial countries in ways that existing models, designed to replicate the features of the U.S. federal funds market, cannot explain. This paper presents an equilibrium model of the overnight interbank market that matches these...

In a 1999 paper, Freeman proposes a model in which discount window lending and open market operations have different outcomes - an important development because in most of the literature the results of these policy tools are indistinguishable. Freeman's conclusion that the central bank should...

Recently, economists have argued that a bank's importance within the financial system depends not only on its individual characteristics but also on its position within the banking network. A bank is deemed to be "central" if, based on our network analysis, it is predicted to hold the most...

We propose a theory to explain why, and under what circumstances, a politician endogenously gives up rent and delegates policy tasks to an independent agency. Applied to monetary policy, this theory (i) formalizes the rationale for delegation highlighted by Alexander Hamilton, the first...