A random variable is difference-form decomposable (DFD) if it may be written as the difference of two i.i.d. random terms. We show that densities of such variables exhibit a remarkable degree of structure. Specifically, a DFD density can be neither approximately uniform, nor quasiconvex, nor...

In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy, Haimanko, Orzach and Sela (Journal of Mathematical...

In this paper, we present the general contribution of n-person game in turbulent environment of parliamentary coalitions. Same basic data about the coalition form and the characteristic function is necessary in order to connect n-person game theory and behavioral game theory. Taking the Norway...

This paper reinterprets the ? -core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can freely merge or break apart, are farsighted (that is,...

This paper reinterprets the ? -core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can freely merge or break apart, are farsighted (that is,...

Three variations of the core of a market game representing an exchange economy are considered and compared. The possibility for utilizing the Walrasian core to reflect certain monetary phenomena is noted.

In this paper we consider a variety of procedures for numerical statistical inference in the family of univariate and multivariate stable distributions. In connection with univariate distributions (i) we provide approximations by finite location-scale mixtures and (ii) versions of approximate...