CEO incentive contracts are commonplace in China but their incidence varies significantly across Chinese cities. We show that city and provincial policy experiments help explain this variance. We examine the role of two policy experiments: the use of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to attract...

All that we know about the CEO labour market in China comes from studies of public listed companies and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This paper is the first to examine the operation of the CEO labour market across all sectors of the Chinese economy. We do so using World Bank enterprise data...

Purpose – Shanghai is the most important economic centre in China. It also has the nation's largest modern office market in terms of floorspace and investment values. However, as with office markets in other cities and countries, the Shanghai market displays rental volatility. This paper aims...

Die sozialen Folgen der marktwirtschaftlichen Reformpolitik Chinas sind schon häufig Untersuchungsgegenstand gewesen (Einkommensentwicklung und -verteilung, demographische Verhaltensweisen). Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird der Frage nachgegangen, wie bestimmte Aspekte von Wirtschaftsreform und...

Despite their theoretical value in tackling principal-agent problems at low cost to firms there is almost no empirical literature on the prevalence and correlates of performance bonds posted by corporate executives. Using data for China we examine their incidence and test propositions from...

Using panel data for all of China's public listed firms over the period 2001-2010 we examine how firms have recruited and rewarded their executives over a decade of huge growth and turbulence. CEO pay is sensitive to firm performance, although the elasticities are lower than for the United...