How do firms in high-income countries adjust to emerging market competition? We estimate how a representative panel of Canadian firms adjusts innovation activities, business strategies, and exit in response to large increases in Chinese imports between 1999 and 2005. On average, process...

We use Chinese customs data to show that unofficial non-tariff barriers were responsible for 50\% of the overall reduction in Chinese imports from the U.S. during the height of the U.S.-China trade war in 2018 and 2019. We infer non-tariff barriers from the change in imports of U.S. products...

In 2009 and 2010, China undertook a 4 trillion Yuan fiscal stimulus, roughly equivalent to 12 percent of annual GDP. The "fiscal" stimulus was largely financed by off-balance sheet companies (local financing vehicles) that borrowed and spent on behalf of local governments. The off-balance sheet...

Starting in the late 1990s, China undertook a dramatic transformation of the large number of firms under state control. Small state-owned firms were privatized or closed. Large state-owned firms were corporatized and merged into large industrial groups under the control of the Chinese state. The...

How does a country's productivity growth a¤ect worldwide real incomes through international trade? In this paper, we take this classic question to the data by measuring the spillover e¤ects of China's productivity growth. Our framework features traditional terms-of-trade e¤ects and new trade...

Resource misallocation can lower aggregate total factor productivity (TFP). We use micro data on manufacturing establishments to quantify the potential extent of misallocation in China and India compared to the U.S. Compared to the U.S., we measure sizable gaps in marginal products of labor and...

China's investment rate is one of the highest in the world, which naturally leads one to suspect that the return to capital in China must be quite low. Using the data from China's national accounts, we estimate the rate of return to capital in China. We find that the aggregate rate of return to...

China's national accounts are based on data collected by local governments. However, since local governments are rewarded for meeting growth and investment targets, they have an incentive to skew local statistics. China's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) adjusts the data provided by local...

Chinese local governments wield their enormous political power and administrative capacity to provide "special deals" for favored private firms. We argue that China's extraordinary economic growth comes from these special deals. Local political leaders do so because they derive personal...

We use administrative registration records with information on the owners of all Chinese firms to document the importance of "connected" investors, defined as state-owned firms or private owners with equity ties with state-owned firms, in the businesses of private owners. We document a hierarchy...