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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001791057
The paper integrates the formation of coalitions by a standard sequential offer procedure and the truthfulness - cheating strategies of their members, which support sequential equilibria. We derive the probabilities of truthfulness for players in a two - and three - member coalition in terms of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014222767
We examine the role of coalitions and their members' private information honesty-cheating strategies within a standard industrial politics tournament model. It is first established that honesty supports a sequential equilibrium in both two- and three-member coalitions. Second, a Lazear-type...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014072263
We study the conjecture that increasing market volatility leads to larger coalitions in an oligopoly. Here, coalition formation decisions are made in a noncooperative game by risk averse firms. They use a sequential offer-counter-offer procedure initiated by Selten and Rubinstein. We find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014188968
We study the conjecture that increasing market volatility leads to larger coalitions in an oligopoly. Here, coalition formation decisions are made in a noncooperative game by risk averse firms. They use a sequential offer-counter-offer procedure initiated by Selten and Rubinstein. We find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014122507