The paper integrates the formation of coalitions by a standard sequential offer procedure and the truthfulness - cheating strategies of their members, which support sequential equilibria. We derive the probabilities of truthfulness for players in a two - and three - member coalition in terms of...

We examine the role of coalitions and their members' private information honesty-cheating strategies within a standard industrial politics tournament model. It is first established that honesty supports a sequential equilibrium in both two- and three-member coalitions. Second, a Lazear-type...

We study the conjecture that increasing market volatility leads to larger coalitions in an oligopoly. Here, coalition formation decisions are made in a noncooperative game by risk averse firms. They use a sequential offer-counter-offer procedure initiated by Selten and Rubinstein. We find that...

We study the conjecture that increasing market volatility leads to larger coalitions in an oligopoly. Here, coalition formation decisions are made in a noncooperative game by risk averse firms. They use a sequential offer-counter-offer procedure initiated by Selten and Rubinstein. We find that...