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The efficiency principle in non-cooperative coalitional bargaining

Okada, Akira - In: The Japanese economic review : the journal of the … 51 (2000) 1, pp. 34-50

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001470320

A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers

Okada, Akira - In: Games and economic behavior 16 (1996) 1, pp. 97-108

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001209167

Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers : theory and application

Okada, Akira - In: Games and economic behavior 73 (2011) 1, pp. 227-235

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009273247

The stationary equilibrium of three-person coalitional bargaining games with random proposers : a classification

Okada, Akira - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 43 (2014) 4, pp. 953-973

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010485787

A dynamic climate negotiation game achieving full cooperation

Okada, Akira - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 214 (2023), pp. 657-669

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014478376

When culture does not matter : experimental evidence from coalitation formation ultimatum games in Austria and Japan

Okada, Akira; Riedl, Arno - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001387222

Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game

Okada, Akira; Riedl, Arno - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001387224

Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game : experimental evidence

Okada, Akira; Riedl, Arno - In: Games and economic behavior 50 (2005) 2, pp. 278-311

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002612914

A noncooperative approach to general n-person cooperative games

Okada, Akira (contributor) - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002879554

Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game : experimental evidence

Okada, Akira; Riedl, Arno - 1999

This paper reports the results of experiments involving a 3-person coalition formation game with an ultimatum bargaining character. The grand coalition was always the efficient coalition decision, whereas the values of the 2-person coalitions are varied such that they lead to an efficiency loss...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009711650