We investigate how financial contracting interacts with lending channel effects by tracing the anatomy of a credit supply shock using micro-level data from a multinational bank. Borrowers with stronger lending relationships, higher non-lending revenues, and those that pledge collateral,...

This paper provides evidence that lenders to a firm close to distress have incentives to coordinate: lower financing by one lender reduces firm creditworthiness and causes other lenders to reduce financing. To isolate the coordination channel from lenders' joint reaction to new information, we...

We demonstrate the central importance of creditors' ability to use “movable” assets as collateral (as distinct from “immovable” real estate) when borrowing from banks. Using a unique cross-country micro-level loan dataset containing loan-to-value ratios for different assets, we find that...

We demonstrate the central importance of creditors' ability to use movable assets as collateral (as distinct from immovable real estate) when borrowing from banks. Using a unique cross-country micro level loan data set containing loan-to-value ratios for different assets, we find that...

We show that laws and institutions that strengthen creditor protection increase expected recovery rates on collateral using unique internal bank data on ex-ante appraised liquidation values and market values of assets pledged as collateral from secured loans in 16 countries. Stronger creditor...

Collateral plays two roles. It may be used as an ex-ante commitment mechanism against agency risk or for hedging expected default risk. Using cross-country loan level data, we find that the commitment motive alone explains collateralization. Going from the lowest to highest quartile of ex-ante...