It has been argued that competing banks make inefficiently frequent use of collateralization in situations where they are better able to evaluate a project's risk than entrepreneurs. We study the bank's choice between screening and collateralization in a model where banks do not have this...

It has been argued that competing banks make inefficiently frequent use of collateralization in situations where they are better able to evaluate a project's risk than entrepreneurs. We study the bank's choice between screening and collateralization in a model where banks do not have this...

This paper analyses the determinants of collateral in loans granted to entrepreneurs and consumers. We use cross-sectional data on more than 39,000 bank loans raised by Vietnamese borrowers between 2006 and 2009. Our data set is unique because it contains information about the bank's assessment...

We investigate the impact of bank competition on the use of collateral in loan contracts. We develop a theoretical model incorporating information asymmetries in a spatial competition framework where banks choose between screening the borrower and asking for collateral. We show that the presence...

We investigate the impact of bank competition on the use of collateral in loan contracts. We analyze asymmetric information about the borrowers’ type in a Salop model in which banks choose between screening the borrower and asking for collateral. We show that the presence of collateral is more...

This paper analyses the determinants of collateral in loans granted to entrepreneurs and consumers. We use cross-sectional data on more than 39,000 bank loans raised by Vietnamese borrowers between 2006 and 2009. Our data set is unique because it contains information about the bank's assessment...