We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The 'TASP … equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes. We use two 4 x 4 games each with a unique mixed Nash equilibrium; one … is stable and one is unstable under learning. Both games are versions of Rock-Paper-Scissors with the addition of a …

number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious … play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We test whether subjects try to influence those … and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation. The experiment was …

Our study analyzes theories of learning for strategic interactions in networks. Participants played two of the 2 x 2 … order shown by Selten and Chmura. This result supports our view that learning in networks is different from learning in …

performance. Measured performance equals actual performance plus noise. We compare a stable environment where the noise is small … with a volatile environment where the noise is large. Subjects exert significantly more effort in the volatile environment …

makers. We ask whether there exist "full learning'' equilibria -- ones in which the players' posterior beliefs eventually …. Surprisingly, in the latter case full learning may be impossible even in the limit as all players become infinitely patient. We …. In this case full learning equilibria exist. …

makers. We ask whether there exist "full learning" equilibria -- ones in which the players' posterior beliefs eventually …. Surprisingly, in the latter case full learning may be impossible even in the limit as all players become infinitely patient. We …. In this case full learning equilibria exist. …

perfectly aligned "full learning" equilibria - ones in which the individuals' posterior beliefs eventually place full weight on … message of all his predecessors. Surprisingly, in the latter case full learning may be impossible even in the limit as all … mediator who can work across time periods arbitrarily far apart. In this case full learning equilibria exist. …